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FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF UNION OFFICERS UNDER
SECTION 501 OF THE LMRDA
In 1959 Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act' as a result of congressional findings of widespread corrup-
tion, breaches of trust, and disregard of the individual rights of employ-
ees.2 The act provides union members with a general "bill of rights," 3
election safeguards, 4 trusteeship regulations, 5 and places detailed financial
reporting and disclosure requirements on unions, employers, and union
officials. 6 Additionally, in a subchapter entitled "Safeguards for Labor
Organizations," the act provides for the continuing judicial supervision of
individual union officers in section 501.' This provision establishes the
fiduciary obligations of union officers. The purpose of this comment is to
examine the breadth of these fiduciary provisions as well as the procedural
prerequisites to enforcing these obligations.
L Breadth of Section 501 's Duty
The Statute and Legislative History
Section 501(a) initially enunciates the general notion that "officers,
agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization
occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members
1. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
2. "The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and
management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust,
corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to
observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further
and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and
interests of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of
labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and
representatives." LMRDA § 2b, 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1970). The quoted provision
refers primarily to the findings of widespread corruption, coercion and violence in
the labor field by the now famous McClellan Committee. See Hearings Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); id, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); id., 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959); S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (final report); S. REP.
No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (second interim report); S. REP. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (interim report); S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956).
3. LMRDA §§ 101-05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).
4. Id. §§ 401-04, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-84 (1970).
5. Id. §§ 301-06, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (1970).
6. Id. §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (1970).
7. Id. § 501(a), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1970).
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as a group.'" An enumeration of specific duties that these persons owe to
the labor organization and its members follows. Specifically, the act
requires:
(a) that these persons hold the organization's money and property
solely for the benefit of the organization and its members;9
(b) that these persons manage, invest, and expend the same in
accordance with its constitution and by-laws, and any resolutions
of the governing bodies adopted thereunder;'
0
(c) that these persons refrain from dealing with the organization as an
adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter
connected with their duties;'
(d) that these persons not hold or acquire any pecuniary or personal
interest which conflicts with the interests of the organization;
12
(e) and that these persons account to the organization for any profit
received by them in whatever capacity connected with business
conducted by them on behalf of the organization.13
Any general exculpatory resolution of a union governing body purporting
to relieve these persons of liability for breaches of the enumerated duties is
void as a matter of public policy. 4 There is one caveat in section 501(a)-
these duties are to be interpreted in light of the special problems and









15. Enactment of this provision was particularly important to organized labor
because it feared that the courts would fail to distinguish between the duties of
corporate directors (to make money) and those of union officials (to improve
benefits for members). George Meany expressed that fear during the committee
hearings: "The committee has approved provisions to which we take vigorous
exception.
"Operating from a premise with which we certainly agree and which we have
consistently supported, that union office is a sacred trust, the committee had
proceeded to establish standards of fiduciary responsibility which could only lead
to widespread confusion and the multiplicity of litigation.
There are certain obvious similarities between the obligation for safe, honest
administration of funds and property entrusted to the care of a union officer or
employee to those obligations which bank or corporate officers owe their stockhol-




Section 3(Q) of the LMRDA defines the persons subject, to these
duties in a broad fashion to include not only the officers and agents, but
also any elected officials and key administrative personnel, whether
elected or appointed (such as business agents, heads of departments or
major units, and organizers who exercise substantial independent authori-
ty). 16
Section 3(Q) has not given courts many interpretive problems.' 7
Section 501(a) is much more troublesome because it initially imposes a
broad duty and then defines specific obligations.
Considerable discussion and even disagreement by the commentators
and courts exists as to the breadth of section 501(a).' 8 The question
generally posed is whether the specific obligations enumerated in section
501(a) are exclusive or merely illustrative of the general fiduciary obliga-
tions of these persons who occupy positions of trust. Since the listing deals
almost exclusively with fiscal matters, the question has been alternatively
stated as whether the fiduciary duties of union officials extend to non-
fiscal matters. There has been no definitive United States Supreme Court
ruling interpreting the breadth of section 501(a). These questions should
be answerable, however, by examining the legislative history of section
501 as well as the text itself.
Section 501 was taken totally from a bill introduced by Representa-
tive Elliot which was reported by the House Committee on Education and
The prime responsibility of the union officer is to advance the interest and
welfare of the members. The prime concern of the banking official is to enhance the
value of the property he holds in trust.
A union does not exist for the purpose of making money. It exists as a
mechanism through which its members can combine to promote their mutual
improvement, both as employees and as members of society generally, and both
materially and in other ways.
One of our main objections is that the reach of this fiduciary concept as
expressed in the bill is not determinable and the property [sic] of many union
activities now considered as normal union functions is shrouded with the blanket of
uncertainty and confusion." 105 CONG. REC. A6402 (1959). The purpose of the
provision is clear, although the writer could not find any decisions specifically
relying on or using the provision.
16. LMRDA § 3Q, 29 U.S.C. § 402(Q) (1970).
17. See, e.g., Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
18. Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501 of the
L.M.R.D.A., 52 MINN. L. REV. 437 (1967);'Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions
Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 827-29 (1960); Dugan,
Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 GEO. L.J. 277 (1959); Note, 75 COLO.
L. REV. 1189 (1975); Note, Counsel Fees for Union Officers under the Fiduciary
Provision of Landrum-Griffin, 73 YALE L.J. 443 (1964).
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Labor. 9 Since there is no indication in the legislative history that any
changes were intended by the House when it included the fiduciary
provision of the Elliot Bill in the Landrum-Griffin Bill (which was ulti-
mately enacted as section 501), the supplementary report on the Elliot Bill
is critical to a proper understanding of the intended scope of the section.
The report provides that the committee intended the fiduciary principle
embodied in the bill to extend to all the activities of union officials and
other union agents or representatives.2 ° Further, the report specifically
negates the idea that the fiduciary principle would apply to union officials
only in their handling of money or other property. 2' Representative Elliot,
the author of the provision, reiterated this broad view in a speech before
the House in which he stated that the provision was a comprehensive
statement of the fiduciary duties of union officers and would apply to such
matters as collective bargaining and conducting daily union business. 22
19. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1959).
20. "We affirm that the committee bill is broader and stronger than the provi-
sions of S. 1555 which relate to fiduciary responsibilities. S. 1555 applied the
fiduciary principle to union officials only in their handling of "money or other
property" (see S. 1555, sec. 610), apparently leaving other questions to the common
law of the several States. Although the common law covers the matter, we consid-
ered it important to write the fiduciary principle explicitly into Federal labor
legislation. Accordingly, the committee bill extends the fiduciary principle to all the
activities of union officials and other union agents or representatives." H.R. REP.
No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959) (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. "We wrote a comprehensive statement of the fiduciary duties of union
officers. The assets of a labor union belong to the members. Union office is a
position of trust to be used for the benefit of the members. In collective bargaining,
and in conducting other business, union officers must put their fiduciary obligations
ahead of their personal interest." 105 CONG. REC. 15,549 (1959). Despite this rather
strong and clear enunciation of intended scope of section 501(a), at least one
commentator has taken the position that it was fiscal wrongdoing, not administra-
tive decision making which Congress intended to circumscribe. Note, Counsel Fees
for Union Officers Under the Fiduciary Provision of Landrum-Griffin, 73 YALE L.J.
443 (1964).
The author supports his opinion by noting that Senator McClellan himself in
proposing the fiduciary provision stated that its aim was to eliminate the serious
misuses of funds, misappropriations, looting of union treasuries, etc. Reliance on
Senator McClellan's statements is erroneous for several reasons. In the first place it
was the Elliot Bill, not the McClellan Bill which was finally enacted-thereby
making Senator McClellan's remarks irrelevant in assessing the Elliot Bill's in-
tended scope. Further, the supplementary report of the Elliot Bill clearly stated that
the provisions of the Elliot Bill were broader and stronger than S. 1555 [Senator
McClellan's Bill] and that the duties extended to all the activities of union officials.
The fiduciary provision proposed by Senator McClellan and adopted by the
Senate as part of S. 1555 declared that any person designated a union official "shall,
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
Further support for this view is the broad statutory language itself.
The command to refrain from dealing with the union as an adverse party
clearly should extend to nonfiscal matters. The broader view is also
consonant with the underlying purpose of the LMRDA, which was to
guarantee democratic functioning of internal union affairs.
Some commentators favor a restrictive approach to section 501 due to
the danger of excessive judicial intervention into the internal affairs of
unions. 23 However, the procedural prerequisites to bring an action under
501(a) lessen that danger by providing for a judicial screening of claims
before suit is allowed to be brought.24
Judicial Interpretation of Section 501(a)
Most of the circuit courts of appeals which have considered the
matter have concluded that section 501 imposes a broad fiduciary duty on
union officials that extends beyond fiscal matters, although this view has
not been accepted with unanimity. In fact, the first United States Court of
Appeals to consider the matter decided that section 501 applied only to
fiscal matters. The Second Circuit in Gurton v. Arons25 based its holding
on the view that section 501 was not intended to be an omnibus provision
under which union officials could be sued on any ground of misconduct.26
with respect to any money or other property in his custody or possession by virtue
of his position as such officer, agent, or representative, have a relationship of trust
to any such labor organization and the members thereof ....... S. 1555, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 610 (1959).
For an extensive examination of the legislative history of the act, see Dugan,
supra note 18.
23. See Dugan, supra note 18. In Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 496
(1968), the Supreme Court criticized such a restrictive view with respect to a Title
IV violation: "[T]his emphasis overlooks the fact that the congressional concern to
avoid unnecessary intervention was balanced against the policy expressed in the
Act to protect the public interest ....... See also Note, 75 COLO. L. REV. 1189
(1975). The author states: "The courts, in short, are to insure only that the union
members themselves run the union." Id. at 1191.
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970) (requires that leave of court must be obtained
before the proceeding be brought; and requires good cause shown with a verified
application).
25. 339 F. 2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964) (case dealt primarily with two controversial
resolutions passed by the general membership, but declared void by International
Executive Board; the plaintiffs were members asking that these resolutions be
effectuated). See also Head v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1975); Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874
(1967).
26. "A simple reading of that section shows that it applies to fiduciary respon-
sibility with respect to money or property of the union and that it is not a catch-all
provision under which union officials can be sued on any ground of misconduct
1977]
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The Second Circuit arrived at this position by erroneously examining the
legislative history of the Senate version of section 501 (the McClellan bill)
and not the legislative history of the Elliot Bill which was ultimately
enacted .27
The majority position is the one taken by the Eighth Circuit in
Johnson v. Nelson.28 There the court concluded that careful analysis of the
whole act refutes the notion that the statute is narrow in its scope and is
limited solely to pecuniary responsibilities or improper use of union
funds. 29
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted section 501 broadly by reasoning
that the action complained of indirectly affected the fiscal matters of the
union. For example, in Kerr v. Shanks3" the action complained of was the
refusal to comply with the duty to hold a referendum and the indirect fiscal
effect was that plaintiffs' salaries, which required authorization by re-
ferendum, remained unpaid. Using this approach, the court reached the
same result as the Eighth Circuit's broad view, but this approach was
rather circuitous. Clearly the enumerated fiduciary obligations are closely
related to pecuniary matters, and a close nexus between the acts com-
plained of and the union's fiscal matters will aid the courts in determining
their role under section 501; but it is not necessary that there be a fiscal
nexus for the court to take jurisdiction under section 501.
Exculpatory Clauses
Section 501(a) provides that any general exculpatory clause included
in a union's constitution and by-laws or enacted as a resolution by any
governing body of a union which purports to relieve the officials of
with which the plaintiffs choose to charge them. If further corroboration for this
position be needed it will be found in the legislative history and in the law review
articles cited by Judge Tenney in his opinion in the district court." 339 F.2d at 375.
27. It is important to note that the Second Circuit stands alone in its narrow
reading of section 501(a).
28. 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
29. Id. at 649. This approach has been followed by a large majority of the
circuit and district courts that have considered it. See Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1973); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski,
457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Cefalo v. Moffet, 449
F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McCabe v. Electrical Workers Local 1377, 415 F.2d 92
(6th Cir. 1969); Parks v. IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 314 F.2d 886
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
30. 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1972). Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. Ohio 1974); Keck v. Employees Independent Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.




liability for breaches of section 501 duties is invalid as a matter of public
policy. Clearly the union could not adopt a provision in its constitution or
by-laws which negated the applicability of section 501 to its officers. The
issue becomes complicated when considering a resolution passed to ex-
cuse a particular breach of a very limited nature. The statutory language
does not address this problem, but resort to the legislative history is helpful
if not dispositive.
The House sponsors of the bill expressed the view that a resolution
purporting to excuse a past breach of the fiduciary duties would be void. 3'
As to future actions, a union's authorization of an officer to take some
action such as investing union funds in bonds would relieve the officer
from losses that occur at a later date, even if the investment later proved
imprudent.32 However, even though a union could authorize an officer to
make expenditures that would normally subject the officer to liability
under section 501, it is clear that a union could not authorize a conflict of
interest situation or pass a resolution allowing an officer to profit from his
position as officer. 33
The first case considering the exculpatory clause provision was High-
way Truck Drivers v. Cohen. 3 The union members had passed a resolu-
tion authorizing the use of union funds to pay counsel fees of the officers
who were charged with embezzling union funds. The plaintiffs attacked
the resolution as falling within the express prohibition of general exculpat-
ory clauses in section 501(a). The court disallowed the payment on the
grounds that the union's constitution did not permit such expenditures.
35
31. "The committee bill ... explicitly invalidates any general provision in a
union constitution or bylaws purporting to excuse union officials from breaches of
trust. The bill follows the well established distinction between conferring authority
upon an agent or trustee, which is permissible and protects him against liability, and
attempting to excuse breaches of trust, which is here made void as against public
policy." H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959). However, there are
contrary views expressed in the legislative history by Senator Goldwater. In his
analysis of the bill, the Senator observed that although union officers may not be
excused for breaches of their fiduciary obligations by any general exculpatory
clauses, they may be relieved "by specific exculpation." 105 CONG. REC. 16,149
(1959).
32. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959).
33. The court would simply invalidate such action as contrary to federal labor
policy as expressed in the LMRDA.
34. 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
35. The court also felt that since the State of Pennsylvania had brought criminal
charges against the officers, it would be against public policy to allow payment of
counsel fees. Id. at 620.
19771
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The court, however, found that the payment was not within the prohibition
of section 501(a) and distinguished it from a resolution purporting to
relieve an officer of liability for breach of the duties declared in section
501(a). 36 This seems to be a proper construction of the act and legislative
history since the resolution merely authorized payment of the fees and did
not absolve the defendants of their guilt. 37
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, Kerr v. Shanks 38 the court consid-
ered, in dicta, an alleged retroactive authorization of a breach of section
501 by way of referendum passed by the membership. The court in fact
found that the conduct of the officer in question was not approved or
authorized by this particular referendum but stated that even if the referen-
dum had included the issue in question and had been approved retroactive-
ly by the members, it would have been of no avail to the defendants." The
court reasoned that to allow such validations of breaches of fiduciary
duties would emasculate the LMRDA and destroy any protection from the
type of improper practices that the act was intended to prevent. 4° The court
unequivocally stated that once a breach of section 501(a) has been estab-
lished, the union is entitled to relief, irrespective of any tardy purported
authorizations. 4' This approach, which helps to insure that members have
a voice in the operation of the union, seems to be the one most consistent
with the purposes of the LMRDA. 42 Submission of a fait-accompli to the
36. Id. at 618.
37. The courts have strictly limited the right of unions to intercede on behalf of
union officials in suits brought under section 501. For example, in Holdeman v.
Sheldon, 204 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 311 F.2d 2 (2d Cir.
1962), the union's motion to intervene was denied where the union had no interest
independent of the defendant officers. Further, in the case of Tucker v. Shaw, 378
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967), the Union's counsel was disqualified from representing
union officials even though the fees were to be paid by the defendant officers. The
reason for such a rule is the potential conflict of interest that the attorney would
face if he represented both the union and the union officials. See, e.g., Teamsters v.
Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246 (D. D.C. 1965).
38. 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 1276 n.3.
40. "To permit such validations of officers' breaches of fiduciary obligations
would be inconsistent with the purposes of The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, one of which is to protect union members, including a minority,
from the improper practices of union management, or an unscrupulous majority of
the membership." Id.
41. Id.
42. "The provision of § 501 would be completely emasculated if every time
. . . the officers . . . breached their duties, they could put through a constitutional
amendment . . . to legitimize their former derelictions .... ." Morrissey v. Cur-
ran, 423 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970). In Morrissey the court
[Vol. 37
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membership is hardly a substitute for prior discussion and therefore should
be strictly scrutinized by the courts.43
Some Applications of the Duty
Due to the broad fiduciary duties imposed on union officials by the
act, the types of conduct that breach those duties range from simple
situations, such as self-dealing," to more complex situations, such as
unprofitable investment of union funds.45 For example, in Anderson v.
Vestal' a breach occurred when a union official bought a car from the
union at a deflated price. The court reasoned that the official was dealing
with the union as an adverse party. 47 Also, unauthorized disbursements of
union funds made to 48 or by49 union officials are recoverable for the
benefit of the union under section 501.50 Moreover, as the court noted in
Puma v. Brandenburg,51 even the reasonableness of the salaries paid
officials may be examined under section 501. Apparently political con-
tributions will not be subject to scrutiny under section 501 if the union's
constitution and by-laws authorize such expenditures. 52 This is so primari-
ly because section 501 does not attempt to regulate or limit the purposes
for which a union may spend money, but rather requires that any funds
upheld an exculpatory clause in a trust agreement relieving the trustees of liability
when they make expenditures on the advice of counsel. This result has been
legislatively overruled by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-381, esp. § lll0(a) (Supp. 1974).
43. One commentator has suggested that the courts should differentiate these
situations from those where the union had ratified certain acts. Homer v. Feron,
362 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966), and Head v. Brotherhood
of Ry. Clerks, 378 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1975), raised the possibility of ratification of allegedly unauthorized acts. However,
it is submitted that ratification action should be strictly scrutinized by the courts in
order to insure the ratification acts are not in fact within section 501's prohibition.
44. Self-dealing is gaining some financial advantage in the portion of trust one
holds (e.g., where a business agent sells jobs to those not otherwise eligible to get
them).
45. An example is where the union invests money in a particular business on
the advice of its officers and without expert consultation.
46. 79 LRRM 2755 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
47. Id. at 2758. Title II of the LMRDA is helpful in ferreting out these conflict
of interest situations by requiring detailed reports of union officials under certain
circumstances. LMRDA § 202(a), 29 U.S.C. § 432 (a) (1970).
48. Cf. McCabe v. IBEW Local Union No. 1377, 415 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1969).
49. Cf. Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1972).
50. A common example of this type of breach is unauthorized pension pay-
ments made by union officials. Cf. Morrissey v. Segal, 526 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1975).
51. 324 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
52. McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975).
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expended be exclusively for purposes authorized by the union's constitu-
tion, by-laws, or resolution of the union's governing body.53
A troublesome area is counsel fees for defendant officers in a section
501 suit. Generally the courts, as a matter of policy, denied these defend-
ants the right to use union counsel or to have their own retained counsel
paid out of union funds.14 The courts reason that to allow the officers to
defend themselves by using the power and wealth of the very union assets
which they are accused of pilfering would defeat the purposes for which
the LMRDA was enacted. 55 However, if a suit against a union official will
have a direct and injurious effect on the union itself or is in reality directed
against the union, the union has the power to lend its financial support to
the officers for legal expenses. 56 Another exception to the general rule is
where the union officers successfully defend the section 501 allegations. 7
Here the policies underlying the act permit reimbursement if authorized by
the union constitution, by-laws or resolution.58 One recent case involving
counsel fees had a peculiar twist. In Morrissey v. Segal,5 9 the officers had
negligently paid pension fund money to an unauthorized recipient, but
they did so on the advice of counsel.' The union's trust fund agreement
53. Id. In Pignotti v. Local No. 3, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held
that union officials are the proper parties to interpret the union's constitution,
provided that the interpretations are fair and reasonable; however, the court noted
that it would not hesitate to strike down conduct otherwise violative of section 501.
Similarly, Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1972), held that the
union officials, not the courts, are to interpret union constitutions; however, unions
have no "carte blanche" to act illegally under the guise of following the constitution
or by-laws.
54. Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1962): "As a general
proposition we think funds of a union are not available to defend officers charged
with wrongdoing which, if the charges were true, would be seriously detrimental to
the union and its membership ....
"The treasury of a union is not at the disposal of its officers to bear the cost of
their defense against charges of fraudulently depriving the members of their rights
as members."
55. Cohen v. Highway Truck Drivers, 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 284
F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). The court added that even
if a majority of the members had approved such a proposal, if the charges against
the officers are proven, such proposal is void. Accord, Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. 182 F. Supp. at 620. For example, where one union has disaffiliated from
another, and the officers of the new union are being sued to return funds, the direct
effect on the new union is obvious.
57. Holdeman v. Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1962).
58. Id.




governing pension fund disbursements had a specific exculpatory clause
relieving officers from personal liability where funds were disbursed on
the advice of counsel.6" The court upheld the exculpatory clause, but
denied the defendants reimbursement of attorney's fees62 a reasoning that
since the legal expenses were causally related to their own misconduct,
reimbursement would not be allowed.63
Violation of Internal Political Rights
The fiduciary obligation embodied in section 501 also protects mem-
bers' internal political rights. This was clearly recognized in Semancik v.
Mine Workers, District No. 56 which involved a permanent injunction
against willful and repeated violations of members' rights of free speech
(Title I of the LMRDA). There, the court expressed the general principle
that "union officers . . . have a fiduciary duty under section 501 . . . to
insure the internal political rights of all members of their organization.' 65
The court thus affirmed that there is a parallel breach of section 501 when
the officers do not respect the other rights granted by the act and/or by
Constitution. In these situations where the member has a direct remedy
under two titles of the act, the finding of a section 501 violation is not
superfluous because section 501(b) of the act (unlike the other sections)
provides that the court may allow the successful plaintiff compensation for
counsel fees. Another example of parallel breaches can be seen in Retail
Clerks, Local 648 v. Retail Clerks International Association ,66 where the
court found violations of sections 101(a)(1) (dealing with equal rights of
members) and 501 when insurgent candidates were fired from their union
jobs immediately after losing an election.67
The courts also seem to be using section 501(b) to enforce rights
secured to members by the union constitution as well. Some examples of
conduct that courts have found to be violative of section 501 are:
(a) Refusal to execute a membership resolution, even though the
officials were relying on directives from the International;68
61. Such an exculpatory clause would be invalid today under ERISA. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A) (Supp. 1976).
62. 526 F.2d at 127.
63. Id. at 128. Similarly, the court noted that had the officers acted blamelessly
or without fault, they would have been entitled to reimbursement.
64. 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972).
65. Id. at 155.
66. 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969).
67. Id.
68. Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
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(b) Refusal to complete arrangements for a special convention to
which the members were constitutionally entitled; 69
(c) Refusal to submit a member-initiated referendum to a vote ;70
(d) Failure to keep the members informed on matters that they must
decide. 7
1
Often violations occur in the election area (Title IV of the LMRDA) which
constitute a parallel breach of section 501. However, Congress has limited
judicial intervention in this area by providing in Title IV that the Secretary
of Labor has the exclusive power to enforce election guarantees. 72 The
Supreme Court in Calhoon v. Harvey73 affirmed the Secretary's exclusive
power in this area. It is still theoretically possible, however, for a court to
take jurisdiction under section 501(b) to remedy pre-election abuses.
Problem Areas: Pensions and Collective Bargaining
There has been considerable uncertainty whether the fiduciary duties
imposed in section 501 extend to the administration of union welfare and
pension plans, which are governed by section 502(a).74 Primarily, the
argument arises from the fact that the fiduciary provisions in the McClel-
lan or Senate version of the bill provided that union officials have
fiduciary responsibilities not only to their labor organization and the
members thereof but also to any trust in which such organization is
interested,75 whereas the bill that was finally enacted simply provides that
union officials occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization
and its members. The argument made is that the failure to include the latter
phrase indicates congressional intent to exclude welfare and pension
plans. 76 This position is augmented by the inclusion of the phrase, "trust
in which such organization is interested," in section 502(a) pertaining to
bonding requirements. The argument assumes too much. 77 Nowhere in the
legislative history are there any remarks to the effect that such funds were
69. Moschetta v. Cross, 48 LRRM 2669 (D.D.C. 1961).
70. Keck v. Employees Independent Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
71. Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
72. Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1970).
73. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1970).
75. The provisions of the McClellan bill were adopted by the Senate in the
Kennedy-Ervin Bill. See S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 610 (1959).
76. This is so because section 501 does not expressly extend its coverage to
officials of a trust in which a labor organization is interested, as did its precursors.
77. Cf. Dugan, supra note 18, at 293-94.
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intended to be excluded; on the contrary the legislative history is replete
with statements which would indicate their inclusion.78
The courts have construed section 501 to cover pension and welfare
plans. 79 However, where the trustees of such funds are composed of union
and employer personnel, the section 501 duty is applicable only to the
union officials because the employer personnel normally occupy a position
in labor-management relations adversary to the union.80 This limit does
not hamper the union members' rights to see that the funds are properly
managed. The Pension Reform Act of 1974 has to some extent superseded
section 501 by providing detailed fiduciary provisions for all trustees of
these funds,8' thereby insuring the proper management of the funds irre-
spective of whether the trustee is an employer representative or union
official.
A more troublesome area is the applicability of section 501(a) to
collective bargaining. Commentators have suggested that section 501 (a) is
applicable to the collective bargaining process.82 Initially it might be
helpful to note that clearly the provisions of section 501 are applicable
with respect to any secret profits or personal benefits received by a union
official as a result of his collective bargaining activities since the act
expressly provides that the official may not deal with the union as an
adverse party.83
78. For example, "The McClellan committee recommendations on regulation
and control of union funds specifically stated that: 'Since union dues moneys, as
well as health and welfare funds, are in actuality a trust, being held for the members
of the union by their officers, the committee feels that attention should be given to
placing certain restrictions on the use of these funds, such as are now imposed on
banks and other institutions which act as repositories and administrators for trust
funds.' " 105 CONG. REC. A8062 (1959) (emphasis added).
79. E.g., Hood v. Journeyman Barbers Union, 454 F.2d 1347 (7th Cir. 1972);
Morrissey v. Curran, 302 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
423 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970).
80. Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). "[S]ection 501(a) seems
to be limited to those who are in some manner working for or connected with the
labor organization, and not to those working on a board of trustees as coordinate
representatives of a management which is usually in an 'adversary' position in
labor-management relations." Id. at 6.
81. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002 (14)(A), 1002(21) & (38), 1031, 1101-134,
1144 (Supp. 1976).
82. See, e.g., A. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 110-12 (1965);
Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions,
Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391,
429-30 (1964); Note, 75 COLO. L. REV. 1189 (1975).
83. That notion is clearly discernible in the legislative history from Representa-
tive Elliot's remarks: "In collective bargaining, and in conducting other business,
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There is little case law on the matter, but the few decisions discussing
it have split. In Schonfeld v. Rarback84 the court found a breach of the
fiduciary provisions of section 501 where the union officials had entered
into a "sweetheart" contract 85 with the employer. 86 Nevertheless, the
courts have shown a great reluctance to involve themselves in the more
complex area of labor negotiations, primarily for two reasons:
(1) the difficulty in determining whether a union bargaining decision
was made as an honest policy choice or through unlawful collu-
sion;
(2) the difficulty of fashioning appropriate relief.
For example, in Echols v. Cook87 the union officials agreed to a cut in
mileage pay for the members when faced with new competition to the
union labor. The dissident members sought an injunction barring the
defendant officers from purporting to act as their officers. The court
reasoned (1) that what the plaintiffs were requesting was for the court to
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the duly elected collective
bargaining representatives; 88 (2) that even if the union's position was
unwise, this is not an issue for determination by the court; 89 (3) that to
comply with the disgruntled members' request would place the court in the
position of a compulsory arbitrator; 90 (4) that an NLRB-supervised elec-
tion is available if the members wish to change their bargaining represen-
tative.9 Similarly, in a recent decision, Carr v. Learner,9 2 the court held
that a claim under section 501 that the union officers had failed to bargain
in good faith with the employer over retirement benefits did not state a
cause of action. 93 The court concluded that section 501 simply does not
union officers must put their fiduciary obligations ahead of their personal interests.
"The failure to recognize this familiar principle lies at the bottom of most of the
wrongdoing uncovered by the Senate select committee. A man cannot faithfully
serve two masters ....
"The committee bill . . .provides an effective remedy by which individual
union members may recover . . . any secret profit which he has acquired through
any abuse of his fiduciary position." 105 CONG. REC. 15,549 (1959).
84. 61 LRRM 2043 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
85. Such-collective bargaining contracts are those entered into by collusion of
the employer and the union.
86. 61 LRRM 2043 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
87. 56 LRRM 3030 (N.D. Ga. 1962).




92. 410 F. Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1976).
93. Id. at 104.
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give the court plenary powers to review the bargaining decisions of union
negotiators. 9 The court noted, as in Echols, that these claims should be
brought to the NLRB, and if such allegations are true, the Board can find
an unfair labor practice under section 8(d)95 of the Labor Management
Relations Act.
96
Apparently the courts are reluctant to infer illegal collusion and,
moreover, will require substantial evidence before taking jurisdiction
under section 501 to remedy collective bargaining problems. However,
the guarantees contained in the LMRDA are designed to improve, not to
impede, the effective function of trade unions and collective bargaining.
As noted by an independent study group sponsored by the Committee for
Economic Development:
It is important that this law not be used as a device to harass union
leaders. Such a result would be doubly unfortunate, since it would
play havoc with orderly relations within the union and in collective
bargaining and it would tend to discourage good men from seeking
union office.
97
A union official should not be liable for honest errors of judgment or even
decisions which may be reasonably thought to be imprudent. It is impor-
tant that the act insure democratic operation of unions, but in the process
the act should not be construed to weaken or undermine their role as
collective bargaining agents.
II. Enforcement of Section 501(a) Rights-Section 501(b)
Section 501(b)98 of the LMRDA regulates the manner of presenting
allegations of fiduciary breaches. The lawsuit envisioned under section
94. Id. at 105.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
96. 410 F. Supp. at 105.
97. Independent Study Group, The Public Interest in National Labor Policy
148-49 (1961).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970) provides: "When any officer, agent, shop ste-
ward, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the
duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its
governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an
accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested
to do so by any member of the labor organization, such member may sue such
officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the United
States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure
an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization.
No such proceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained upon
verified application and for good cause shown, which application may be made ex
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501(b) resembles a stockholders' derivative suit brought in the corporate
context in that the conditions precedent to instituting a section 501(b)
action are similar. 9 Generally, section 501(b) provides that following an
alleged violation of a section 501(a) duty, the dissident union member'0°
must first make demand on the labor organization to sue to recover
damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief.10' If the labor
organization fails to do so within a reasonable time, 10 2 the member may
sue, in either federal or state court, the union officials who have allegedly
breached their duties. 03 However, in order to sue, leave of court must be
obtained by verified application and for good cause shown." ° These
procedural prerequisites are designed to protect the union from undue
harassment and vexatious litigation. Lastly, section 501(b) provides that
the trial judge may allow successful plaintiffs compensation for litigation
expenses including counsel fees.105
Proper Parties
The fiduciary duty is owed to the labor organization and its members
as a group. Section 501(b) recognizes this rule by requiring that the relief
sought be for the benefit of the labor organization. 106 However, this does
not preclude a member from using section 501 to remedy a personal wrong
he has suffered at the hands of union officials. For example, in Johnson v.
parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action under
this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of the
member of the labor organization and to compensate such member for any ex-
penses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation."
99. For example, there must be a demand for the union governing body or
officials to take action, and the relief sought must be for the benefit of the labor
organization. See, e.g., Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1968). Note also
the remarks of Representative Elliot: "Section 501(b) provides that if the union fails
to bring suit upon the request of the member, the member may apply to any State or
Federal court for leave to bring an action on behalf of the organization similar to a
minority stockholder's suit against a corporation." 105 CONG. REC. 15,549 (1959).
100. The case law is in agreement that a member of the labor organization must
be the one who brings suit, i.e., not a member of another union. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1968).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970).
102. Id. The writer's research revealed no cases where what is a reasonable time
under section 501(b) was discussed. However, note that under Section 402(A)(2)
three months is designated as the outside limit of a reasonable time requirement, in







Nelson 107 the court ordered union officials to deliver to the plaintiffs funds
duly voted to them by the membership as reimbursement for their ex-
penses in defending themselves against prior wrongfully brought union
charges.' 08 The court reasoned that the vindication of the plaintiffs' rights
benefitted the organization by restoring integrity to the union's internal
democratic process.'°9
Also, the courts do not allow section 501(b) actions to be brought
by" 0° or against"' unions. Thus the act is strictly construed as allowing
actions to be brought only by union members and only against "union
officials" as that term is defined in the act. One court has reasoned that
since the union may avail itself of state remedies directly, the union is not
a proper plaintiff under section 501(b).112
The interstitial area of disaffiliation or merger is troublesome. As
noted earlier, the procedural prerequisites of section 501(b) are designed
to protect the union from undue harassment and vexatious litigation. It is
obvious these requirements serve no purpose when the old union is no
longer in existence due to a disaffiliation or merger. Yet the courts have
still required standing to sue (the member requirement),"' and have held
that members of the new entity may not sue the officers of the old as such
under section 501(b).114 It is submitted that in such cases the procedural
requirements of section 501(b) are inapposite and should not be blindly
applied without looking to the reason underlying the rule. However,
irrespective of the loss of action under section 501(b), the former members
still have a state court action to remedy their grievances.115
107. 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
108. Id. at 653.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Safe Workers Organization v. Bollinger, 389 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.
Ohio 1974).
111. See, e.g., Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 853 (1972); Aho v. Bintz, 390 F. Supp. 577, 579 (D. Minn. 1968); Woody v.
Sterling Aluminum Prod., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 84, 88-89 (E.D. Mo. 1965), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967), reh. den., 386 U.S. 1027 (1967).
112. See Safe Workers Organization v. Bollinger, 389 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Ohio
1974).
113. See, e.g., Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1968) (disaffiliation);
Bruno v. Mundy, 127 N.J. Super. 84, 316 A.2d 474 (1973) (merger).
114. See, e.g., Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1968).
115. This notion was suggested in the Phillips case. Later the plaintiff in Phillips
brought a state court action in Washington to recover funds after there had been a
disaffiliation. The defendants (former union officials) obtained an injunction from




There has been considerable question whether the demand required to
be made on the union officials is a necessary prerequisite for suit. The
reason for the demand is to give the union a chance to make a good faith
effort at remedying the situation. Ordinarily, a request is necessary or the
proceedings will be dismissed. "6 However, a few recent cases suggest
that the demand need not be made if the request would be futile." 7
Some courts have treated the demand requirement as a matter of
form. For example, in Cassidy v. Horan,l"1 the court held that a general
demand directed to the union to return money spent against the union's
interest was insufficient since the officials were not asked to sue them-
selves. 119 It is suggested that this position totally ignores the reason for the
demand rule and is unduly technical. Fortunately this approach is not
being followed, as illustrated by a recent case, Dinko v. Wall,'120 where
the court faced the issue of whether a letter to the union by a dissident
member asking for an accounting was sufficient to meet the demand
requirement. In holding that it was sufficient, the court noted that more
often than not the union members are of limited education and are rarely
represented by counsel when requesting action by the union.121
Good Cause
Another procedural prerequisite to suit is the showing of good cause,
Several interpretations of the phrase "good cause" have been suggested
by the commentators. 122 The legislative history indicates that the intended
meaning of the phrase is probable cause..23 Probable cause is usually
federal court's earlier judgment. The Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) reversed,
stating that the matter had never been litigated and that the court's earlier ruling that
the plaintiff had no standing to sue under 501(b) was not res judicata to the state
court action. See id.
116. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.
1965).
117. Hood v. Journeyman Barbers Union, 454 F.2d 1347 (7th Cir. 1972);
McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975).
118. 405 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1968).
119. Id.
120. 531 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 73.
122. See Clark, supra note 18.
123. This approach finds support in the legislative history in remarks made by
Senator Javits, one of the sponsors of the bill that section 501(b) was taken from:
"If the member is given leave to sue-in other words if he shows some probable
cause-he may sue." 105 CONG. REC. 6529 (1959).
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defined as a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warrant-
ing the proceedings prayed for.' 24 Good cause is and should be an elastic
concept and is often used as a shorthand summary of the underlying policy
reasons why a litigant should be able to attain a specified result. Here,
there are two competing policies: (1) the supervision of union officials in
the exercise of their fiduciary obligations; and (2) protection, through a
preliminary screening mechanism, of the operations of unions against
unjustified interference or harassment. Both of these policies can be best
served if section 501(b) is construed to mean that the plaintiff must show a
reasonable likelihood of success by demonstrating a reasonable basis for
believing the material facts he has alleged.
Procedurally, the allegation of good cause can be made ex parte. 125
When considering the plaintiff's allegations, the judge may look beyond
the pleadings and consider testimony in order to determine whether good
cause has been shown. 126 If defendants wish to contest that finding of good
cause, courts allow them to move to vacate the order allowing suit. 127 This
is a good practical way to allow the unions to protect themselves from
harassing litigation. 128
124. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (4th ed. 1951).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970).
126. Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958(1966),
where the court stated: "Thus if the defendant can establish, by undisputed af-
fidavit, facts which demonstrate that the plaintiff is not a member of the defendant
union, or that the action is outlawed by a statute of limitations, or that the action
cannot succeed because of the application of the principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel, or that plaintiff has not complied with some controlling condi-
tion precedent to the bringing of such a suit, then although these defects do not
appear on the face of the complaint, they may warrant denial of the application.
"However, we think it inappropriate to consider, at such a hearing, defenses
which require the resolution of complex questions of law going to the substance of
the case. Defenses of this kind should be appraised only on motion for summary
judgment or after a trial. Defenses which necessitate the determination of a genuine
issue of material fact, being beyond the scope of summary judgment procedure, are
a fortiori, beyond the scope of a proceeding to determine whether a section 501(b)
complaint may be filed. Defenses involving disputed questions of fact should be
appraised only after a trial at which the parties and the court can have the benefit of
a complete inquiry, assisted by such pre-trial discovery as may be undertaken." Id.
at 229.
127. See, e.g., Dinko v. Wall, 531 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1976).
128. Also, it is not necessary that a union member exhaust all of his internal
union remedies before bringing this action. See, e.g., Purcell v. Keane, 406 F.2d
1195 (3d Cir. 1969); Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
958 (1966); contra Penuelas v. Moreno, 198 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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Counsel Fees and Litigation Expenses
As in most other fiduciary contexts, the act allows the judge to allot a
"reasonable part of the recovery" to the plaintiffs for counsel fees and
litigation expenses. 129 Because of the term "recovery," there was initially
confusion and discussion as to whether the plaintiffs had to receive a
money judgment before this provision was operative. 3° However, the
courts have construed this section as meaning that any time a plaintiff is
successful in proving a breach of the fiduciary duties, irrespective of
whether he obtains a money judgment, injunction or other relief, the judge
may allow such expenses. '3 I Such expenses are payable by the local union
in whose benefit the judgment is had 132 after a claim for such fees is made
to the local union governing board. '33 Not surprisingly, the courts have
also held that it is not necessary that the local union be joined as a party
before it is assessed for costs. 134
Conclusion
The imposition of fiduciary obligations on union officials represents a
landmark in federal labor legislation. After the findings of widespread
corruption in the particular unions investigated by the McClellan Commit-
tee, it is clear that section 501 was sorely needed. Theoretically, the
section gives the judiciary a tool with which it can fashion certain
minimum ethical and legal standards by which the behavior of union
leaders must be measured, and it provides the courts with authority and
flexibility to insure that the rules imposing obligations or duties on union
officials receive more than mere formal compliance.
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of section 501 is the inartful
drafting of the act which leads to problems concerning its scope. Congress
should have used more definitive language which would not be open to so
many varying interpretations. It is important that union officials, attor-
neys, and, most importantly, lay members know exactly what the respec-
129. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970).
130. See Note, Counsel Fees for Union Officers under the Fiduciary Provision of
Landrum-Griffin, 73 YALE L.J. 443 (1964).
131. See, e.g., Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1972).
132. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 928 (1970).
133. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Horan, 405 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1968).
134. E.g., Local 92, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Structural & Ornamental Iron Work-
ers v. Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tive rights and duties of the parties are. Although there is not yet a great
deal of case law under section 501, certain patterns are emerging that are
consistent with the policies underlying the act, and the courts appear to be
willing to use section 501 as a tool to insure democracy in the internal
operations of unions.
Pete Lewis
